










Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Université Pierre Mendès France 
Unité Mixte de Recherche 1215 
Domaine Universitaire - BP 47 - 38040 GRENOBLE Cedex 9 
Tél. : 33 (0) 4 76 82 54 39 - Fax : 33 (0) 4 76 82 54 55 


























JEL CODES : L15 ; L50 
 
KEYWORDS : LABEL ; IMPERFECT CONSUMER INFORMATION ; VERTICAL PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION ; VERTICAL RELATIONS ; REGULATION  
 
 
Working Paper GAEL ; 2010-01 
 Downstream labeling and upstream price competition
Olivier BONROY∗†‡,S t é p h a n eL E M A R I É †‡
May 2010
Abstract
This paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two verti-
cally related markets. Labeling on the downstream market aﬀects upstream price competition
through two eﬀects: a diﬀerentiation eﬀect and a ranking eﬀect. The magnitude of theses
two eﬀects determines who in the supply chain will receive the beneﬁts and who will bear
the burden of labeling. For instance, whenever the ranking eﬀect dominates the diﬀerentia-
tion eﬀect, the low-quality upstream ﬁrm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are
individually better oﬀ. By decreasing the low quality input price, the label acts then as a
subsidy which assures an increase of the downstream market welfare. This analysis furthers
our understanding of the economic consequences of the public labeling in cases like restaurants
or GMOs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last decade governments greatly increase the implementation of production attribute labels.
For example, in France publics labels enable restaurants to indicate that their food is produced
with regional and fresh ingredients. In the US, some eggs, poultry and beef products carry labels
regulated by the USDA such as "organic" and "no hormones". In Austria and in Germany, a public
label provides consumers with the certainty that foodstuﬀs with this label contain no genetically
modiﬁed ingredients. These examples share two important features. First, products come from a
rather long supply chain with no information problem in the upstream part and an information
asymmetry in the downstream part. Second, the implementation of a label to solve the information
problem in the downstream part may reverse the ranking of products in the upstream part.
To illustrate this general problem, consider the restaurants in tourist areas. Two upstream
industries supply either fresh or frozen ingredients to restaurants and the output is then supplied to
the consumers. Restaurants located in tourist areas cannot build reputation: consumers generally
visit restaurant only once, without having any ex-ante information on the quality of the food. So,
restaurants that supply meals cooked with fresh, regional ingredients can hardly be diﬀerentiated
from restaurants that used frozen, non-regional ingredients (generally precooked food). Local
foods prepared with fresh, regional ingredients are unanimously preferred by consumers. However,
without a signal, restaurants have little interest in providing the local foods and would prefer to
use the frozen ingredients, which are more cost saving because easier and quicker to prepare. The
French public label Maitre Restaurateur, implemented in 2007, guarantee that foods are cooked
with fresh and regional ingredients. This label may reverse the preferences of restaurants. By
signaling with such a label, consumer willingness to pay increases for the foods produced in these
restaurant. Despite their technical and cost advantages at the restaurant level, frozen ingredients
are now considered low-quality inputs because consumers have a lower willingness to pay for the
foods produced with these ingredients.
Consider a more controversial case, products produced from genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMO). Monsanto, the leading US company in the development of GMOs, sells its technology
in seeds to farmers, not to the ﬁnal consumers. Seeds are diﬀerentiated in the upstream market.
R e l a t i v et ot h ec o n v e n t i o n a ls e e d s ,G M O ss e e d sp r o v i d ef a r m e r sc o s ts a v i n g s . 1 Experimental
studies provide evidence that the consumer willingness to pay for products produced with GMOs
in the downstream market signiﬁcantly decreases once the products are labeled (Noussair et al.,
2004,L u s ke tal., 2005). We can infer that, with labeling, GMO seeds are low-quality inputs,
1GMOs seeds have a technical advantage for the farmer because they enable better pest control.
2despite technical cost advantages for the farmers.
This stylized fact about the reversal of quality ranking in downstream markets has not gener-
ally been considered by the literature. Unlike the present paper, the existing literature on quality
certiﬁcation instruments is largely based upon vertical product diﬀerentiation models where only
the ﬁnal market is considered. For instance, in a typical vertical diﬀerentiation oligopoly, as in
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) or Shaked and Sutton (1982), more information about product qual-
ity leads to an increase in both product diﬀerentiation and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Indeed, with imperfect
information about the quality, products are considered homogeneous and Bertrand competition
drives proﬁts to zero.2 Labeling enables ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate their products and therefore reduces
competition. As long as it is not too costly, all ﬁrms gain from certiﬁcation even the low-quality
ﬁrm. Garella and Petrakis (2008) extend this analysis by assuming a Dixit-Spence-Bowley model
of demand. These authors show that a minimum quality standard increases the ﬁrms’ returns
from quality improving investments. As a consequence ﬁrms are better oﬀ. In contrast, two re-
cent papers show that labeling may intensify competition too. Roe and Sheldon (2007) show that
public labeling may drive prices down and decrease the proﬁt of the low-quality ﬁrm when the
market is not perfectly contestable.3 Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) consider that products are
diﬀerentiated under imperfect information because consumers have diﬀerent beliefs concerning the
trustworthiness of each ﬁrm. These beliefs may converge after labeling, leading to more intense
competition and lower proﬁts for the suppliers.
The few papers that consider the eﬀect of labeling with a longer supply chain can be found in
literature about GMOs. However, unlike the present paper, strategic interaction between upstream
suppliers is absent in their analysis. Lapan and Moschini (2007) assume competitive farmers and a
competitive processing industry. They ﬁnd that the labeling standard preferred by farmers would
be stricter than what is optimal for consumers and for societal welfare. Fulton and Giannakas
(2004) consider a supplier of GMO seed (the life science company) with some market power and
competitive farmers.4 They show that the preferences for GMO labeling for farmers, consumers
and the life science company are diﬀerent.5
2This outcome is negated if the high-quality ﬁrms can credibly inform consumers about quality by using ex ante
mechanisms such as advertising, price signaling or reputation.
3See also Marette (2007) for the analysis of a minimum quality standard when the market is non perfectly
contestable.
4Fulton and Giannakas (2004) assume that high-quality seed (conventional seed) is supplied at constant and
exogenous price, but they recognize that strategic interactions between both seed industries may exist in real world:
“Industry evidence suggests, however, that the price of the traditional seed and pesticide packages may change after
the introduction of the GM crops.”(p.47).
5Labeling has no eﬀect on seeds prices in their model. The traditional seed price is exogenous, and the GM seed
equilibrium price is the same under the no-labeling and the labeling regimes because of the particular speciﬁcations
of their model.
3The present paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a context of two vertically
related markets. We consider a supply chain with an upstream duopoly market and a competitive
downstream market characterized by heterogeneous producers and consumers. The quality of the
input chosen by the downstream producer determines the quality of its output. Under imperfect
information, the quality of outputs is unknown to the ﬁnal consumers; therefore products can
only be diﬀerentiated in the upstream market. This diﬀerentiation generates proﬁts for both
upstream ﬁrms. When a label is available, the high-quality producers adopt it, so that products
are diﬀerentiated in both the upstream and the downstream markets.
Our central result is that, by revealing the quality on the downstream market, the label has
two eﬀects on the upstream price competition. First, instead of being diﬀerentiated only at the
producer level, products also become diﬀerentiated at the ﬁnal consumer level. The diﬀerentiation
eﬀect of labeling tends to relax price competition, as the literature on diﬀerentiated products has
clearly established. Second, labeling reverses the ranking of the inputs in terms of quality and
prices since the cost-saving input is used to produce the low-quality output. This eﬀect has not
been mentioned in the existing economic literature and is obtained here because of the setting with
two vertically related markets. We show that the magnitude of theses two eﬀects determines who
in the supply chain will receive the beneﬁts and who will bear the burden of labeling. For instance,
whenever the ranking eﬀect dominates the diﬀerentiation eﬀect, the low-quality ﬁrm loses from
labeling while all consumers are individually better oﬀ. This result contrasts with standard results
on vertical diﬀerentiation in the literature. Furthermore, without a suﬃciently large ranking eﬀect
the label fails to improve the welfare on the downstream market, i.e. the one where the label is
implemented.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the model and the equilibrium both
with and without labeling. The impact of labeling is analyzed in Section 4.D i ﬀerent extensions
are then presented in Section 5, followed by the conclusion.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a supply chain with two vertically related markets. In the upstream market, there
are two ﬁrms (i ∈ {1,2}), each supplying a particular type of input to a continuum of competitive
intermediary producers. For clarity, in this paper the term “ﬁrms” refers to upstream suppliers,
while the term “producers” refers to intermediary producers who supply the downstream market.
The ﬁnal production is sold on the downstream market to a continuum of consumers.E a c h
producer buys either zero or one unit of input and each consumer buys either zero or one unit of
4ﬁnal product. We assume that one unit of input is required to produce one unit of output, and that
the quality of the ﬁnal product is determined by the type of input used. The high quality product
is deﬁned as the product unanimously preferred by consumers. This one is also the less cost saving
for producers. This deﬁnition, central in this model, is quite realistic and can be illustrated by
the GMO or the restaurant cases. In the GMO case, several studies show that consumers consider
GM-free food as being of better quality (Lusk et al., 2005), but other studies show that GM-free
production is less cost saving because the pest control is less eﬃcient compared to the use of GMO
(Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). In the restaurant case, using the fresh food is less cost
saving in time and personnel compare to the frozen food, while it is unanimously preferred by
consumers.
There is no information problem in the upstream market: each producer knows perfectly the
quality qi supplied by the ﬁrm (i ∈ {1,2}). Without loss of generality, we assume that the low
quality product is the product 1 and the high quality product is the product 2 (q1 <q 2). Two
environments are considered for the downstream market. In the labeled environment, a certifying
public organization allows each producer that uses the input 2 to identify itself by a label for
free. In the unlabeled environment, consumers cannot diﬀerentiate the quality of ﬁnal product.6
We assume that each consumer believes that the ﬁnal product is of low quality, q1 (i.e. using
input 1). This situation is characterized by a lemon problem (Akerlof, 1970): without information
about upstream demand and supply, consumers can only anticipate that all producers will choose
the more cost-saving input. Alternative speciﬁcation of this consumer belief will be considered in
Section 5.
Table 1. Consumer and producer surplus
Unlabeled environment Labeled environment
Producer surplus πi (ω)=p − ri − ωqi πi (ω)=pi − ri − ωqi
Consumer utility U (θ)=θq1 − p Ui (θ)=θqi − pi
The surplus of the producer and the consumer in both the labeled and unlabeled environments
are deﬁned in Table 1. ri and pi are, respectively, the price in the upstream and the downstream




such as the market
is uncovered. Producers are uniformly distributed along a cost parameter ω ∈ [0,ω].7 The mass of
6We assume that the production of low quality cannot be punished so that no producer can build reputation
as in the case of experience goods. This is for example the case when consumers do not know the quality of the
good bought even after consumption (see e.g. Darby and Karni, 1973, Garella and Petrakis, 2008,o rB o n r o ya n d
Constantatos, 2008), or when the purchase relationship is not repeated.
7In the GMO example, ωqi represents the cost of pests due to the yield loss. If we consider that ω captures the
pest pressure level, it is coherent to suppose that farmers are heterogeneous with respect to this parameter because
5both producer and consumer populations is normalized to one. Consumers (respectively producers)
choose the product that provides them with the highest surplus and do not consume (respectively
produce) if this surplus is negative. The input quality is exogenous and upstream production costs
are identical and normalized to 0.
The decision sequence corresponds to a two-stage game. At stage 1, the upstream ﬁrms choose
the input prices ri simultaneously, in a Bertrand game. At stage 2, all downstream producers and
consumers act as price takers, so that the downstream equilibrium price pi equalizes supply to
demand.
3 Equilibrium on downstream and upstream markets
- Equilibrium on the downstream market (stage 2). We ﬁrst present the unlabeled environment,
followed by the labeled one. These solutions enable us to establish the demand function on the
upstream market, that we then use to solve stage 1 of the game.
In the absence of labeling, only one product is sold in the downstream market. Demand and
























Only producers with ω<
p−r1
q1 remain active and, among them, those with ω>r1−r2
q2−q1 choose
the input 1 while the others choose input 2. The price of the downstream product is determined
by equating D(p) to S(p) which yields p =
r1θ+q1θω
θ+ω .8 The demand functions on the upstream
















We now consider the labeled environment: the two products are diﬀerentiated on the down-
stream market and their quality is known by consumers.9 It can easily be shown that consumers
pest pressure level is known to vary signiﬁcantly among farms. It is recognized that GMOs are more valuable on
farms with high pest pressure (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006). In the restaurants exemple, ωqi represents
the cost for preparing a meal and ω captures the heterogenity of restaurants (ability of staﬀ to prepare meals).
8Note that, as a consequence of the market atomicity assumption, the high-quality producers do not use a lower
price to signal the true quality. Only one price level in the downstream market is possible at the equilibrium.
9It can be observe that, because labeling is free for the producers, those who choose the input 2 cannot lose from
adopting the label. So the label environment equilibrium is the same whatever the type of public label: voluntary
or mandatory.
6prefer product 2 if θ>
p2−p1
q2−q1 and product 1 otherwise, and that all consumers with θ<
p1
q1 refrain
from buying. Similarly, producers prefer the product 1 if ω>
(p2−p1)−(r2−r1)
q2−q1 and product 2 oth-
erwise, and all producers with ω>
p1−r1





































Both downstream prices are determined by equating D2(p1,p 2) to S2(p1,p 2) and D1(p1,p 2) to
S1(p1,p 2). The derived demand functions on the upstream market are determined by introducing

















- Equilibrium on the upstream market (stage 1). On the upstream market, ﬁrm i (i =1 ,2)
solves the following maximization problem:10
maxΠi
ri
= ri Si(ri,r j) (6)















Since the ﬁnal products are undiﬀerentiated in the downstream market, the low-quality product is
more cost saving and, consequently, priced at a higher level compared to the high-quality product.
The equilibrium output price is:
pU =










As the upstream market is diﬀerentiated, each ﬁrm and each active producer has a positive
proﬁt. Note that when producers are homogenous (i.e. ω =0 ), both output and input are sold at
10Only linear pricing can be concidered here because each producer purchases either 0 or 1 unit of input.
7marginal cost so that no ﬁrms and no producers make a positive proﬁt. The downstream market
is then a competitive market characterized by a constant marginal cost, and the upstream market
is a duopoly market characterized by the Bertrand paradox.











while output prices are:
pL
1 = q1θ











At equilibrium, the price of the labeled product on the downstream market is higher compared
to the price of the non-labeled product.
Unlike the unlabeled environment, when producers are homogenous (i.e. ω =0 ) upstream ﬁrms
have a positive proﬁt. As the downstream market is diﬀerentiated, upstream ﬁrms may diﬀerentiate
their product and earn the same positive proﬁts as in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly model
without intermediary producers (see Wauthy, 1996).
4C o n s e q u e n c e s o f a l a b e l
In this section we investigate the economic consequences on the markets when the downstream
producers can adopt a label. We start by analyzing the consequences on the upstream market by


















SL >S U iﬀ ω
θ >k 1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Two major eﬀects explain the input price variation caused by the labeling. First, products
are diﬀerentiated in both the upstream and downstream markets instead of only in the upstream
market. As in a standard vertical diﬀerentiation model, information about quality diﬀerences tends
to increase the price of each product (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, and Shaked and Sutton,
1982). We call this ﬁrst eﬀect “diﬀerentiation eﬀect”. Second, the label aﬀects product ranking.
Without labeling the ﬁnal product is undiﬀerentiated. All producers therefore prefer low-quality







By signaling the qualities in the downstream market, the label reverses product ranking since
all active producers will then prefer the high-quality input, despite its higher cost.11 Hence, at
equilibrium we have rL
2 >r L
1 . We call this second eﬀect “ranking eﬀect”.
Both eﬀects positively aﬀect the high-quality upstream price. A better valorization of the high-
quality product leads, unsurprisingly, to an increase of the corresponding input price, i.e. rL
2 >r U
2 .
More interestingly, these eﬀects aﬀect the low-quality upstream-price in opposite directions. As
for the high-quality input price, the diﬀerentiation eﬀect is positive. But, on the other hand, the
ranking eﬀect is negative. Finally, when these two eﬀects are added, we ﬁnd that the ranking






if the ratio ω
θ is high enough. In an unlabeled
environment with a high level of ω,t h el o w - q u a l i t yﬁrm wants to exploit producers with a high
willingness to pay for the low-quality product, and charge a high price. As a result, when the
qualities are known, if heterogeneity among consumers is not suﬃciently high, the diﬀerentiation
eﬀect is dominated by the ranking eﬀect: Firm 1 cannot avoid decreasing its price.
In summary, the heterogeneity of the producers relative to the consumers (ω
θ) is the determi-
nant in balancing the diﬀerentiation and the ranking eﬀects on the low-quality input price. On
the one hand, higher heterogeneity of consumers (θ)i n c r e a s e st h ed i ﬀerentiation eﬀect by relaxing
competition with labeling. On the other hand, higher producer heterogeneity (ω) relaxes compe-
tition without labeling and leads to a more important ranking eﬀect because of the higher input
price (rU
1 ). We can observe that the ratio ω
θ is also an indicator of the price elasticity of the
supply relative to the price elasticity of the demand, both on the downstream market. As this
ratio increases, the share of producer surplus relative to the sum of the producers and consumers
surplus increases.
Proposition 1 The high-quality ﬁrm always beneﬁts from labeling. The low-quality ﬁrm is hurt
by labeling iﬀ ω










Proof. See Appendix 2.
In a standard vertical product diﬀerentiation model, labeling is desirable for all ﬁrms. The
revelation of the true product quality allows the high-quality ﬁrm to extract more surplus from
customers with higher willingness to pay for quality, while also leaving room for the lower-quality
ﬁrm. The price competition is relaxed, and both ﬁrms enjoy superior proﬁts. In the vertical
structure considered in this paper, this result is not always true. As we saw in Lemma 1,l a b e l i n g
11It is easy to show that when both inputs are priced to marginal costs (rL
2 = rL
1 =0 ), all active producers (i.e.




q1 ) prefer the high-quality input.
9leads to a decrease of the price of the low-quality input if the ranking eﬀect is strong enough.
The low-quality ﬁrm is then always hurt by the label (ω
θ >k 2 is always respected)12.C o n v e r s e l y ,
an increase of the low-quality input price is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for the low-
quality upstream supplier to gain. The low-quality ﬁrm gains from labeling if the price increase is
suﬃciently high to compensate the loss of consumers. Finally, as in a standard vertical product
diﬀerentiation model, the high-quality ﬁrm always beneﬁts from labeling.
We now investigate the economic consequences of labeling on the downstream market.
Lemma 2 pL
1 <p U iﬀ ω
θ >k 1 ; |pL
1 − pU| < |rL
1 − rU
1 | ; pL
2 >p U and pL
2 − pU >r L
2 − rU
2
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Recall that labeling enables to diﬀerentiate the two products on the downstream market: the
high-quality product for which consumers have a greater willingness to pay, and the low-quality
product for which consumers have the same willingness to pay compared to the product sold without
label. The higher willingness to pay for the high-quality product leads, unsurprisingly, to an
increase of its price (pL
2 >p U). As observed before (lemma 1) the price of the corresponding input
increases, but this increase does not cover the output price increase. For the low-quality product,
the producers face the same demand curve because the consumers have the same propensity to
pay for their production. The downstream price equilibrium after labeling depends only on the
variation of the production cost (i.e. input cost): the downstream price increases (pL
1 >p U)i fa n d
only if the corresponding input price also increases (rL
1 >r U
1 ). The labeling leads to a parallel
shift of the low-quality supply curve, and the equilibrium price variation from this shift does not
cover the variation of the production cost (|pL
1 −pU| < |rL
1 −rU
1 |). Therefore the eﬀect of labeling
on the low-quality product is similar to a subsidy (if ω
θ >k 1)o rat a x( i fω
θ <k 1).
In summary, labeling enables the high-quality ﬁrm to diﬀerentiate its product from the low-
quality product, and leads to an upward shift of its demand curve by consumers. This shift leads
to an increase of the output price which is partially transmitted to the input price. As a result,
the low-quality input price may increase or decrease, and this variation in the production cost is
partially transmitted to the output price.
Proposition 2 Each active intermediary producer and active ﬁnal consumer gains from labeling
if ω
θ >k 1. Otherwise, only those who produce or consume the labeled product can be better oﬀ.










10Proof. See Appendix 4.
This proposition studies the impact of labeling on each producer and consumer. The main
result is that each of them gains from labeling if the low-quality input price decreases (i.e. if the
ranking eﬀect dominates the diﬀerentiation eﬀect). A more detailed analysis requires a separate
analysis of the diﬀerent categories of producers and consumers according to their choice in both
unlabeled and labeled environments (see Figures 1 and 2).
Some categories always gain from labeling. Consumers who, under labeling, choose the high-
quality product generally gain from an increase in the quality despite a higher price. In the same
way, the producers who choose the high-quality input in both environments gain because the
output price increase is not covered by the input price increase (cf. Lemma 2). In summary, the
producers and consumers who are part of the high-quality supply chain always gain from labeling.
Nevertheless, a few marginal producers and consumers may be an exception to this rule, e.g. some
high-quality consumers with a relatively low willingness to pay and some producers that switch
from the input 1 to the input 2 (see areas U → 2 in Figure 2 and 1 → 2 in Figure 1).
The producers and consumers who are not part of the high-quality supply chain beneﬁtf r o m
labeling only if the low-quality input price decreases. Recall that, when comparing the two unla-
beled and labeled environments, the consumers have the same willingness to pay for the product
(θq1), and the variations in prices of both the low-quality input and output have the same sign.
Hence the variation of utility or proﬁt for these actors only depends on the variation of low-quality
input price, which are similar to the eﬀects of a tax or a subsidy. In summary, if the input price in-
creases (i.e. if ω
θ <k 1), some producers and consumers lose by leaving the markets, the low-quality
consumers lose because they consume the same product at a higher price, and the low-quality pro-
ducers lose because the output price increase does not cover the input price increase (cf. Lemma
2). Conversely, if the input price decreases (i.e. if ω
θ >k 1), some producers and consumers gain by
entering into the markets, the low-quality consumers gain because they consume the same product
at a lower price, and the low-quality producers gain because the input price decrease is not covered
by the output price decrease (cf. Lemma 2). This result contrasts with the standard result that
more diﬀerentiation generally hurts consumers with lower willingness to pay for quality.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide interesting insights concerning the economic consequences of the
adoption of a label by the high-quality producers. On the one hand, the revelation of the product
quality generates positive externalities on the other actors (the upstream ﬁrm and the consumers)
of the high-quality supply chain. On the other hand, the adoption of the label can creates a
tension between the upstream and the downstream actors within the low-quality supply chain.
11This tension depends on the magnitude of the diﬀerentiation and ranking eﬀect described before.
If ω
θ <k 2, the diﬀerentiation eﬀect is suﬃciently large that the upstream low-quality ﬁrm beneﬁts
from the label, while the producers and the consumers are worse oﬀ. Indeed labeling leads to a less
intensive competition among the upstream ﬁrms, such that the low-quality input price increases,
which is like a tax for the downstream actors. Conversely, if ω
θ >k 1,t h er a n k i n ge ﬀect dominates
and the low-quality input price decreases: the upstream ﬁrm loses proﬁt and the label acts on
the low-quality output production as a subsidy. Between these two extreme situations, there is a
set of parameters values (k2 < ω
θ <k 1) such that the label is detrimental to all the actors of the
low-quality supply chain.
We now study the aggregate impact of labeling. As in a standard vertical product diﬀerentiation
model, enabling the diﬀerentiation is always welfare improving. Then, a government has always
interest to implement a label. The last proposition below analyzes the surplus variation of the
downstream actors (producers and consumers) taken all together.
Proposition 3 Collectively, all intermediary producers gain from labeling iﬀ ω
θ >k 3,a n da l lﬁnal
consumers gain from labeling iﬀ ω
θ >k 4.A sk3 >k 4,a l lc o n s u m e r sg a i nf r o ml a b e l i n gw h e na l l
intermediary producers gain from labeling.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
As we saw in the Proposition 2, some of the producers or consumers individually lose from
labeling if the low-quality input price increases. Proposition 3 deﬁnes the threshold values of ω
θ
such as the collective downstream surplus is positively or negatively aﬀected by the label. We
ﬁnd that when the diﬀerentiation eﬀect strongly dominates the ranking eﬀect (ω
θ <k 4)13,l a b e l i n g
decreases without ambiguity the downstream surplus. This result shows an interesting outcome
of labeling: when the ranking eﬀect is not suﬃciently large, a governmental label fails to improve
the surplus of downstream actors. The gain of the high-quality downstream actors is not suﬃcient
to cover the loss of the low-quality downstream actors. In this case, the positions of downstream
actors and government about the labeling diﬀer: the downstream part of supply chain do not want
the label while it improves the social welfare.
5E x t e n s i o n s
We ﬁrst discuss our assumption on consumers’ beliefs in the unlabeled environment. Recall that,
in our basic model, having no information about the upstream market, consumers believe that all
13k1 >k 2 >k 3 >k 4 (see Figure 3).
12producers choose the more cost-saving input. As a result they expect the low quality (qe = q1).
However, consumers may better anticipate the real proportion of each quality and expect a quality
between q1 and q2. We consider here an alternative speciﬁcation where the consumers perfectly
anticipate the proportion of each quality and expect an average quality weighted by the market
share of each product: qe = αq1+(1− α)q2 where α is the endogenous proportion of the low-quality
product. The main diﬀerence with our basic model is that the consumer’s willingness to pay for the
low-quality product in the labeled environment is lower than for the expected quality (θq1 <θ q e).
This change aﬀects the price variation between the expected-quality product and the low-quality
product (pL
1 − pU). In the basic model this price variation depends only on the low-quality input-
price variation (rL
1 − rU
1 , cf. lemma 2)w h i l e ,i nt h i se x t e n s i o n ,t h i sp r i c ev a r i a t i o ni sa l s oa ﬀected
by the shift of the demand function of consumers with low taste parameter. Despite this diﬀerence,
this extension does not qualitatively modify our main results summarized in Propositions 1 to 3.14
The threshold values on the ω
θ are diﬀerent but are ordered similarly. For example, with q1 =1 /2,
q2 =1and θ =1 , rL
1 <r U
1 iﬀ ω>0.282, ΠL
1 < ΠU
1 iﬀ ω>0.106 and SCL >S C U iﬀ ω>0.023.15
As in our basic model, if ω is large enough, the ranking eﬀect dominates the diﬀerentiation eﬀect
so that low-quality input price decreases, the proﬁt of the low-quality ﬁrm also decreases, and all




1 <p U are not the same: pL
1 <p U iﬀ ω>0.236 and rL
1 <r U
1 iﬀ ω>0.282.
The market conﬁguration so far is an uncovered market because the lower bound of the con-
sumer taste parameter (θ) is equal to 0. Assuming a covered market makes the analysis more
complex because it leads to a continuum of downstream price equilibria16 but otherwise leaves
our main results qualitatively unmodiﬁed. The only exception concerns the impact of labeling
on downstream actors, which depends on the downstream price equilibrium considered.17 For
example, when the downstream price equilibrium is such that the participation constraint of the




1 = pU = q1θ
¢
. In this case, the label does not hurt consumers, but producers may be worse
oﬀ. Conversely, when the downstream price equilibrium is such that the participation constraint





1 = pU − rU
1 = q1ω
¢
. Any variation of the low-quality input price is directly
14It is not possible to get any tractable analytic solution with this extension. Numeric resolutions were performed
with Mathematica and comparative statics derived from multiple simulations.
15The computations are available from authors upon request.
16For example, in the unregulated environment, any downstream price p ∈ [r1 + q1ω,q1θ] fulﬁlls both covered
market conditions (π1(ω) > 0 and U(θ) > 0), and is consequently an equilibrium.
17It is important to note that the choice of downstream equilibrium price aﬀects only output prices and, con-
sequently, the surplus sharing between producers and consumers. The upstream price and quality chosen by any
producer or any ﬁnal consumer are the same, irrespective of the downstream equilibrium price considered.
13transmitted to the low-quality output price. In this case, labeling does not hurt producers, but
consumers may be worse oﬀ.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This article is a contribution to the literature on the economic impact of labeling. We focus here
more particularly on strategic eﬀects, by considering a simple framework with costless labeling
and two vertically related markets. By solving an information problem on product quality in the
downstream market, labeling has some indirect consequences on the competition in the upstream
market. In particular, we show that the upstream market price competition is aﬀected by a ranking
eﬀect by which the more cost-saving technology becomes less valuable because it leads to a low-
quality product for the ﬁnal consumer. The case of GMOs is a ﬁne illustration of this framework.
This technology is more cost-saving because it enables the farmer to control pests better, but
consumers have a lower willingness to pay for the agricultural product when the farmer uses GMO
seeds. The labeling of the GMO, as required by the European Union, aﬀects the ranking of these
technologies. The farmer considers not only the cost-saving attribute of the GMO but also the fact
that its production will be sold at a lower price. Beyond this illustration, our analytical framework
is applicable to a wide range of situations where downstream labeling aﬀects the ranking of products
in the upstream markets.
A standard strategic eﬀect in the literature is that labeling softens competition by further
diﬀerentiating the two products. This eﬀect can however be dominated by the ranking eﬀect so
that labeling hurts the upstream supplier of the low-quality input to the beneﬁt of the low-quality
downstream actors. This phenomenon occurs in particular when the upstream competition is
weaker in the unlabeled environment than in the labeled environment. This result improves our
understanding of the eﬀects of certain labels. It shows that public labeling of restaurants that use
fresh and local ingredients may aﬀect the low-quality restaurants like a subsidy, and it helps to
explain Monsanto’s opposition to the labeling of GMOs.18
18Monsanto takes a clear position against labeling, stating “to date, no approved biotech crop
is either an allergen, or has any signiﬁcant nutritional diﬀerences from non-GM counterparts”, and
consequently “requiring labeling for ingredients that don’t pose a health issue would undermine
both our labeling laws and consumer conﬁdence.” These citations are from Monsanto’s web site:
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto_today/for_the_record/gmo_labeling.asp.
This opposition can also be explained by the fact that labeling could aﬀect consumers’ belief about the GMO
quality increasing the perception of low quality.
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SL − SU =
(q2−q1)θ((4q2−q1)ω−3q1θ)
(4q2−q1)(θ+ω)(3q1θ+(4q2−q1)ω) > 0 iﬀ ω

























(4q2−q1)(3q1θ+(4q2−q1)ω) > 0 iﬀ ω
θ <k 1.














































Appendix 3: Proof Lemma 2.
pL
1 − pU =
(q2−q1)q1θ
2(3q1θ−(4q2−q1)ω)
(4q2−q1)(θ+ω)(3q1θ+(4q2−q1)ω > 0 iﬀ ω
θ <k 1,
|pL
1 − pU| < |rL
1 −rU
1 | iﬀ
¯ ¯θ(3q1θ − (4q2 − q1)ω)
¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯(θ + ω)(3q1θ − (4q2 − q1)ω)
¯ ¯ that is always
true.
pL


















Appendix 4: Proof Proposition 2.
i) Impact on surplus of each producer:
Let us ﬁrst consider the producers who choose the same input in both unlabeled and la-














(4q2−q1)(θ+ω)(3q1θ+(4q2−q1)ω > 0; and producers who choose
17the low quality product gain from labeling iﬀ ω













(4q2−q1)(θ+ω)(3q1θ+(4q2−q1)ω > 0 iﬀ ω
θ >k 1.
Producers that switch from the low to the high quality may be worse oﬀ only when ω
θ <k 1
and for suﬃciently high ω producers (see Figure 1 for a graphic representation).
ii) Impact on surplus of each consumer:
Lemma 1 and 2 show that when ω
θ >k 1 then SL >S U and pL
1 <p U. It follows that when
ω
θ >k 1 more consumers participate in the market and low-quality consumers are better oﬀ (and
conversely).
Consumers of high-quality labeled product always gain if ω
θ >k 1 (otherwise they would gain
by choosing low quality). Whenever ω
θ <k 1,s o m eo ft h e mw i t hl o wθ may be worse oﬀ (see Figure
2 for a graphic representation).
Appendix 5: Proof Proposition 3.
i) The impact of label on producers’ surplus is given by:19










πL − πU > 0 iﬀ ω
















ii) The impact of label on consumers surplus is given by:20




SCL − SCU > 0 iﬀ ω
θ >k 4 ≡
3q1(3q1−2q2)
(4q2−q1)(2q2+3q1)
iii) Figure 3 shows the ranking of k1, k2, k3 and k4.
















































































Figure 1. Producers’ choice according to ω.
19Figure 2. Consumers’ choice according to θ.
20Figure 3. Ranking of k1, k2, k3 and k4.
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